

Grok's take on Universal Ostrich Farm - an AI analysis of two videos

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This is a continuation of my ongoing articles relating to AI (see: <u>Privacy Compliance and More - Articles</u> – https://dksdata.com/SGArticles) and COVID (see: **COVID 19 Articles** https://dksdata.com/COVArticles).

Today I asked Grok to analyse two videos. Below are the links to these videos as provided to Grok. The second video (analyzed first) is a 4-hour discussion focused on the current and past history of Universal Ostich Farms in BC, Canada. This farm has gained international attention, including official communications from the US Trump administration's heads of health and research services.

- **RFK Jnr.** Secretary HHS (all US health).
- Dr. Jay Bhattacharya -Head of NIH (all US medical research).
- Dr. Marty Makary Commissioner of FDA (drug & food safety).
- Dr. Mehmet Oz Head of Medicare/Medicaid

These officials have access to trillions of dollars and thousands of staff. However, before making official public statements to the Canadian government, there was an apparent lack of even a basic Google search by these top people in the US government health and research administration.

I have written to the UBC, CFIA, Health Canada, and various MP's in Canada to try and get answers to clear concerns revolving around this international media circus and apparent unauthorised and non-compliant BL3 research lab in Canada. At the time of writing, I have received no reply.

https://dksdata.com/Court/Ostrich/UBC-StruthioBio-Pelech.pdf

Journalist Rick Walker and I discussed the implications in video 2 linked below.

- 1. Drea Humphrey (Rebel News) interviews Dr. Steven Pelech (UBC Professor and expert witness for the ostrich farm) <u>https://x.com/DreaHumphrey/status/1929049378448171429</u>
- 2. Rick Walker (Journalist) & David Dickson (forensic investigator/retired police) https://www.youtube.com/live/0T9Y7UHdAJo?si=HSZq4_R_zYlVDbQf&t=5390

This is the initial Grok summary of video 2.

- 1. David Dickson and Rick Walker discuss Universal Ostrich Farm in Edgewood, B.C., focusing on its involvement in COVID-19 research and potential biosafety concerns.
- 2. They highlight the farm's collaboration with the University of British Columbia (UBC) and a consortium, noting that handling COVID samples requires a Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) lab in Canada.
- 3. Dickson questions the farm's practices, pointing out that ostriches are injected with SARS-CoV-2 spike proteins, and their eggs are sold for consumption while manure is also distributed, raising concerns about virus spread or mutation.
- 4. They reference Dr. Steven Pelech's statement from June 1, 2025, confirming the birds are used for research, not consumption, contradicting the farm's public claims of selling eggs for eating.
- 5. Walker and Dickson note the farm's history with avian flu, as the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) ordered a cull of 400 ostriches in December 2024 after two tested positive, sparking protests and legal battles.
- 6. They discuss the farm's claim of herd immunity from a 2020 flu-like disease, which Universal Ostrich argues makes their birds scientifically valuable for research rather than culling.
- 7. Dickson emphasizes the lack of transparency from mainstream and alternative media, questioning why the full story isn't being covered, as mentioned in his post on June 3, 2025.
- 8. They explore financial troubles at the farm, including foreclosure issues and mortgage defaults, with the land reportedly in receivership as of August 2024, per court records shared by user Rezdain.
- 9. Walker highlights the involvement of Immune Biosolutions, a company linked to the farm, which focuses on egg-based research, adding another layer to the farm's scientific activities.
- 10. They critique the farm's testing claims, noting user thatgirlfromtiktok's clarification that whole-genome sequencing was used, not just PCR tests, contradicting the farm's statements.

Website references provided by Grok.

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/universal-ostrich-rfk-jr-1.7543030

https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/robert-f-kennedy-jr-dr-oz-universal-ostrich-facts-needto-know-1.7548634

https://thetyee.ca/News/2025/05/16/BC-Ostrich-Farm-Far-Right-Crusade/

https://www.iheart.com/podcast/338-maverick-news-with-rick-wa-111489678/episode/ostrich-cullimminent-on-bc-farm-275566169/

When asked to further explain the BL3 implications, Grok responded.

Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) labs are designed to handle pathogens that can cause serious or potentially lethal diseases through inhalation, such as SARS-CoV-2, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, or West Nile virus. These labs are subject

to strict requirements to protect lab personnel, the public, and the environment from accidental exposure or release of dangerous pathogens. The requirements for BL3 labs are defined by guidelines like the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) from the CDC and Health Canada's standards for Containment Levels, as noted in the web results. Below, I'll break down the key requirements for a BL3 lab, focusing on facility design, safety protocols, personal protective equipment (PPE), and operational practices.

1. Facility Design and Engineering Controls

BL3 labs require specific infrastructure to ensure containment of hazardous pathogens:

- Physical Separation: The lab must be isolated from general access areas, often located in a separate building or a controlled zone within a larger facility. Access is restricted to authorized personnel only.
- Sealed Environment: All penetrations (e.g., for plumbing, electrical systems) must be sealed to prevent air leaks. Windows, if present, must be sealed and unbreakable.
- Negative Air Pressure: The lab must maintain directional airflow, meaning air flows into the lab from surrounding areas to prevent pathogens from escaping. This is achieved through a negative pressure system, with exhaust air filtered before release.
- HEPA Filtration: Exhaust air must pass through High-Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters to capture infectious agents. Supply air may also be filtered, depending on the setup.
- Double-Door Entry: Access to the lab typically requires passing through an anteroom or airlock with interlocking doors to minimize air exchange with the outside environment.
- Decontamination Systems: The lab must have an autoclave (for sterilizing equipment and waste) either within the lab or nearby. Some labs also use dunk tanks, pass-through chambers, or fumigation systems for decontamination.
- Hands-Free Features: Sinks, soap dispensers, and other equipment are often hands-free to reduce contamination risks. Sinks are required near exits for handwashing after handling pathogens.

2. Safety Protocols and Operational Practices

BL3 labs enforce strict procedures to minimize the risk of exposure or release:

- Risk Assessment: Before any work begins, a detailed risk assessment is conducted by a team including the principal investigator, biosafety officers, and institutional biosafety committees to determine the appropriate containment level and protocols.
- Standard Microbiological Practices: These include basics from lower biosafety levels (BSL-1 and BSL-2), such as no eating or drinking in the lab, proper handwashing, and decontaminating all potentially infectious materials (e.g., with bleach or isopropanol) before disposal.
- Restricted Access: Only trained and authorized personnel can enter the lab. Visitors, if allowed, must follow the same protocols and be escorted.
- Decontamination of Waste: All waste, including biological materials, must be decontaminated before disposal, either within the lab (via autoclave) or packaged for off-site treatment.
- Spill and Emergency Procedures: Detailed protocols must be in place for handling spills, exposures, or other emergencies, including evacuation plans and post-exposure medical evaluations.
- Medical Surveillance: Personnel may be subject to medical monitoring, vaccinations (if available), or baseline serum samples to track potential infections.

• Training: All personnel must undergo extensive training on handling pathogens, using PPE, and following lab-specific protocols. Refresher training is often required annually.

3. Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

PPE in BL3 labs is more stringent than in lower-level labs to protect against inhalation risks:

- Respiratory Protection: Depending on the pathogen, personnel may need to wear respirators (e.g., N95 masks or powered air-purifying respirators [PAPRs]) to protect against aerosols.
- Full-Body Coverage: Lab workers typically wear solid-front gowns, lab coats, or coveralls that are fluidresistant. Gloves (often double-layered) are mandatory, and they must overlap with sleeves to ensure no skin exposure.
- Eye and Face Protection: Safety goggles or face shields are required to protect against splashes or aerosols.
- Change Protocols: Personnel must remove PPE before leaving the lab, often in the anteroom, and follow a specific sequence to avoid contamination. Street clothes are typically not worn inside the lab; dedicated lab clothing is used instead.

4. Additional Precautions

BL3 labs incorporate extra measures to handle the specific risks of aerosol-transmissible pathogens:

- Biological Safety Cabinets (BSCs): All work with infectious agents must be conducted inside a Class II or Class III BSC, which provides a HEPA-filtered environment to contain aerosols. Class III cabinets offer the highest containment, often used for the most dangerous pathogens.
- Controlled Aerosol Procedures: Procedures that might generate aerosols (e.g., centrifugation, pipetting) must be conducted in a way that minimizes risk, often within a BSC or using sealed equipment.
- Signage and Labeling: The lab entrance must display a biohazard symbol, the biosafety level, and contact information for the lab supervisor. Specific hazards (e.g., "SARS-CoV-2 research") may also be noted.
- Security Measures: Access control systems (e.g., keycards, biometric scanners) are often used to limit entry and track who enters the lab.

5. Regulatory and Oversight Requirements

In Canada, as mentioned in the X posts and web results, BL3 labs are governed by standards like those from Health Canada and the Canadian Biosafety Standard (CBS). Additional oversight may come from institutional biosafety committees or, in this case, a consortium involving UBC:

- Licensing and Inspections: Labs must be licensed and regularly inspected to ensure compliance with biosafety standards.
- Documentation: Detailed records of training, risk assessments, incidents, and maintenance (e.g., of BSCs or HVAC systems) must be kept.
- Pathogen Accountability: Pathogens must be inventoried, and their transfer or disposal must follow strict regulations to prevent misuse or accidental release.

Context from the X Posts

The X posts highlight concerns about Universal Ostrich Farm potentially operating as an "open-air BioLab" for COVID-19 research, which would require BL3 containment if handling SARS-CoV-2 samples, as noted by David Dickson. The posts suggest a breach of BL3 safety because the farm is selling ostrich eggs for consumption and

distributing manure, which could risk spreading the virus or its spike proteins. BL3 requirements, like sealed environments and strict waste decontamination, are meant to prevent such scenarios. The farm's apparent lack of these controls (e.g., selling eggs instead of treating them as biohazardous waste) raises red flags about compliance with BL3 standards.

Why BL3 Matters

The stringent requirements of BL3 labs are critical because pathogens at this level, like SARS-CoV-2, can cause serious illness or death if released. Historical data from the web results notes over 5,000 accidental lab infections and 190 deaths worldwide by 1999, underscoring the risks. For example, aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is a known concern, and BL3 protocols like negative air pressure and HEPA filtration are designed specifically to address this. If Universal Ostrich Farm is conducting such research without adhering to BL3 standards, as alleged, it could pose significant public health risks.

Let me know if you'd like me to dive deeper into any specific aspect of BL3 requirements or their relevance to the situation at Universal Ostrich Farm!

Website references provided by Grok.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety_level

https://www.cdc.gov/labs/pdf/SF__19_308133-A_BMBL6_00-BOOK-WEB-final-3.pdf

https://www.hseblog.com/bsl-3/

https://consteril.com/biosafety-levels-difference/

Grok was asked about the statements of Dr. Steven Pelech and Drea Humphrey (video 1) in relation to risk.

Yes, the statements of Dr. Steven Pelech, as discussed in the video clip by Drea Humphrey, could potentially put supporters and visitors to Universal Ostrich Farm at risk, given the farm's apparent lack of adherence to Biosafety Level 3 (BL3) protocols while handling SARS-CoV-2. Here's a detailed analysis based on the information provided and the context of BL3 requirements:

1. Lack of BL3 Adherence

- BL3 Requirements: As outlined earlier, BL3 labs are designed for handling pathogens like SARS-CoV-2, which can cause serious diseases through inhalation. Key requirements include physical isolation, negative air pressure, HEPA filtration, and strict waste decontamination to prevent accidental exposure or release. The farm's operation as an "open-air BioLab," as alleged by David Dickson and Rick Walker, suggests it does not meet these standards.
- Injection of SARS-CoV-2: Pelech's confirmation that the ostriches are injected with SARS-CoV-2 spike proteins for research purposes indicates direct handling of a BL3-level pathogen. Without proper containment (e.g., sealed environments, BSCs, and controlled aerosol procedures), this activity poses a significant risk of environmental contamination.
- Sale of Eggs and Manure: The farm's practice of selling ostrich eggs for consumption and distributing manure into the community, as noted by Dickson, further exacerbates the risk. BL3 protocols mandate that all potentially infectious materials be decontaminated before disposal or distribution. Selling these products without such treatment could introduce SARS-CoV-2 or its components into the food chain and broader environment, potentially leading to human exposure.

2. Risk to Supporters and Visitors

- Direct Exposure: Supporters or visitors going to the farm could be at risk of direct exposure to SARS-CoV-2 if proper biosafety measures are not in place. This includes inhalation of aerosols generated during handling (e.g., injection procedures) or contact with contaminated surfaces, equipment, or animals.
- Secondary Exposure: Even if visitors do not directly handle the pathogens, they could be exposed through secondary routes, such as contact with farm workers, equipment, or areas where infectious materials are present. The lack of controlled access and decontamination protocols increases this risk.
- Community Spread: The distribution of eggs and manure into the community, as highlighted, could lead to wider transmission risks. Supporters advocating for the farm might unknowingly contribute to this by promoting its products or activities, potentially affecting public health.

3. Implications of Pelech's Statements

- Credibility and Influence: Pelech's statements lend credibility to the farm's research activities, which could encourage more supporters to visit or engage with the farm. His role as a respected scientist (e.g., his work with the COVID Care Alliance on natural immunity) might reassure people that the farm's practices are safe, despite the lack of BL3 compliance.
- Misleading Perception: By confirming the research without addressing the biosafety concerns, Pelech's statements might mislead supporters into believing the farm operates under safe conditions. This could increase their willingness to visit or support the farm, heightening their risk of exposure.
- Legal and Ethical Concerns: Pelech's involvement, as a representative of UBC and a member of a consortium governing BL3 requirements, raises questions about whether he is aware of or endorsing the farm's non-compliance. If he is not addressing these risks, it could be seen as negligent, especially given the potential public health implications.

4. Context from Related Posts and Web Results

- David Dickson's Concerns: Dickson's posts (e.g., on June 1 and 3, 2025) explicitly question the farm's BL3 compliance, noting the requirement for handling COVID samples in Canada and the farm's failure to meet these standards. His mention of selling eggs and manure into the food chain aligns with the risk of community exposure.
- Rick Walker's Discussion: Walker's conversation with Dickson further emphasizes the farm's role as an "open-air BioLab," reinforcing the notion that it does not adhere to necessary biosafety protocols.
- Web Results on BL3: The Canadian Biosafety Standard and other sources confirm that SARS-CoV-2 handling requires BL3 containment, including measures to prevent environmental release. The farm's practices, as described, clearly violate these standards.
- Food Safety Risks: The web result from the WHO and other sources highlights the potential for foodborne transmission of coronaviruses, even if indirect. Selling eggs without decontamination could facilitate such transmission, posing a risk to consumers and, by extension, supporters who might consume or distribute these products.

5. Potential Consequences

- Health Risks: Supporters visiting the farm could face health risks from direct exposure to SARS-CoV-2, especially if they are not informed of the lack of biosafety measures. This could lead to infections, particularly if they are immunocompromised or unaware of the risks.
- Legal Liability: The farm, and potentially Pelech or UBC if complicit, could face legal liability if supporters or the public suffer harm due to exposure. The CFIA's actions, as discussed in the video, already indicate regulatory scrutiny, and non-compliance with BL3 could exacerbate this.

• Public Trust: The discrepancy between Pelech's endorsement of the research and the farm's unsafe practices could erode public trust in scientific and academic institutions, especially if harm occurs. This is particularly sensitive given the historical context of lab accidents (e.g., over 5,000 infections and 190 deaths by 1999, as noted in web results).

Conclusion

Pelech's statements, by confirming the farm's research without addressing its lack of BL3 compliance, could indeed put supporters at risk. The farm's injection of SARS-CoV-2 into ostriches, combined with the sale of eggs and manure without proper decontamination, violates critical biosafety protocols designed to prevent environmental and human exposure. Supporters visiting the farm or engaging with its products may be unaware of these risks, and Pelech's influence could exacerbate this by lending undue credibility to the farm's operations. This situation underscores the importance of transparency and adherence to biosafety standards, especially when handling dangerous pathogens like SARS-CoV-2.

Website references provided by Grok.

https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/laboratory-biosafety-biosecurity/biosafety-directivesadvisories-notifications/sars-cov-2.html

https://www.kcl.ac.uk/fifty-nine-labs-around-world-handle-the-deadliest-pathogens-only-a-quarter-scorehigh-on-safety https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.0c06822

https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety

When asked about the implications of the above in relation to the Canadian Consortium of Academic Biosafety Level 3 (CCABL3) Laboratories – Grok responded.

The University of British Columbia (UBC) is a member of the Canadian Consortium of Academic Biosafety Level 3 (CCABL3) Laboratories, which is responsible for overseeing and ensuring compliance with biosafety standards for handling dangerous pathogens like SARS-CoV-2. The CCABL3's role, as described on its website, involves bringing together directors of Canadian academic BL3 facilities and key decision-makers from the Public Health Agency of Canada (PHAC) and the National Microbiology Laboratory (NML) to maintain high biosafety standards. Given this context, the activities at Universal Ostrich Farm, as described in the X posts and related discussions, raise significant concerns about compliance with CCABL3 requirements and broader biosafety protocols. Let's break this down step-by-step:

1. CCABL3's Role and Requirements for Handling SARS-CoV-2

- Purpose of CCABL3: The consortium aims to ensure that academic BL3 labs in Canada adhere to strict biosafety protocols for handling Risk Group 3 (RG3) pathogens, including SARS-CoV-2. This involves maintaining facilities that prevent accidental exposure or release of these pathogens into the environment.
- BL3 Standards: As per the Canadian Biosafety Standard and the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL) guidelines, handling SARS-CoV-2 requires a BL3 lab with features like negative air pressure, HEPA filtration, sealed environments, and restricted access. The CCABL3 would expect UBC, as a member, to uphold these standards in any research involving SARS-CoV-2, whether conducted on campus or off-site through collaborations.
- Oversight and Compliance: The CCABL3's involvement suggests that UBC should be monitoring and ensuring that any off-site research, such as that at Universal Ostrich Farm, complies with these standards. Failure to do so could breach the consortium's expectations and national biosafety regulations.

- 2. Injecting Birds with SARS-CoV-2 in an Open-Air, Publicly Accessible Area
 - Violation of BL3 Protocols: Injecting SARS-CoV-2 into ostriches in an open-air, publicly accessible area, as alleged by David Dickson and Rick Walker, directly contradicts BL3 requirements. BL3 labs must be physically isolated, with controlled access and measures to prevent aerosol transmission. An open-air environment lacks these critical controls, posing a risk of environmental contamination and public exposure.
 - CCABL3 Implications: UBC, as part of CCABL3, is expected to ensure that any research involving SARS-CoV-2, even if conducted off-site, adheres to BL3 standards. The farm's practices, if true, would represent a significant breach of these standards, potentially implicating UBC in non-compliance if it is aware and not taking action.
 - Public Health Risk: The lack of containment in an open-air setting increases the risk of SARS-CoV-2 spreading to farm workers, visitors, or the surrounding community. This is particularly concerning given the historical data on lab accidents (e.g., over 5,000 infections and 190 deaths by 1999, as noted in web results), highlighting the dangers of mishandling RG3 pathogens.

3. Transporting Eggs, Birds, and Products Off-Site for Testing and Sale

- Transportation Requirements: The web results, such as Chapter 11 from Boston University's Office of Research, specify that biological materials, especially those above Risk Group 2, must be transported with strict precautions, including labeling with biohazard symbols, using sealed containers, and ensuring integrity during transit. Eggs, birds, or products contaminated with SARS-CoV-2 would need to be treated as biohazardous materials.
- CCABL3 Expectations: The CCABL3 would expect that any transport of materials involving SARS-CoV-2, such as eggs or blood samples, follows these protocols to prevent accidental release. Selling eggs for consumption or distributing manure, as noted by Dickson, without decontamination, violates these expectations and poses a risk of foodborne or environmental transmission.
- Legal and Ethical Concerns: Transporting potentially infectious materials off-site without proper containment could lead to legal liabilities for UBC and the farm if harm occurs. The CCABL3's role in oversight means UBC could be held accountable for not ensuring compliance, especially if Dr. Steven Pelech, a UBC affiliate, is involved in the research.

4. Storing Antigens and Antibodies at the Farm's Location

- Storage Requirements: BL3 labs require secure storage of infectious materials, often in locked freezers or refrigerators within the containment area. Antigens and antibodies derived from SARS-CoV-2, as mentioned in the Save the Ostriches website and Pelech's statements, must be stored under conditions that prevent accidental release or exposure.
- Farm's Non-Compliance: Storing these materials at the farm, which lacks BL3 infrastructure, does not meet the required standards. The web results from Health Canada's Biosafety Handbook emphasize the need for controlled storage within a containment zone, with access restricted to authorized personnel.
- Risk to Farm Personnel and Visitors: Improper storage increases the risk of exposure for farm workers and visitors, including supporters. If antigens or antibodies are not handled or stored correctly, they could contaminate the environment or be accidentally released, leading to potential infections.

 CCABL3 Oversight: UBC's involvement through Pelech suggests a responsibility to ensure proper storage, even off-site. The CCABL3's expectations would include monitoring such activities to prevent breaches of biosafety protocols.

5. Implications for Supporters and the Community

- Risk to Supporters: As discussed earlier, Pelech's statements could encourage supporters to visit the farm, unaware of the biosafety risks. The farm's non-compliance with BL3 standards, combined with UBC's CCABL3 affiliation, heightens this risk. Supporters could be exposed to SARS-CoV-2 through direct contact, contaminated products, or environmental release.
- Community Impact: The sale of eggs and distribution of manure into the community, without decontamination, could lead to wider public health risks. This is particularly concerning given the historical context of coronaviruses potentially causing foodborne transmission, as noted in WHO guidelines.
- CCABL3's Role in Mitigation: The CCABL3's mandate includes preventing such risks by ensuring compliance with biosafety standards. UBC's failure to address the farm's practices could undermine the consortium's credibility and expose it to criticism or legal action if harm occurs.

6. Broader Context and Conflicts

- Financial and Policy Interests: The Save the Ostriches website mentions a \$590 million grant to Moderna for bird flu vaccines, suggesting potential conflicts of interest. The CFIA's actions, as discussed by Humphrey and Pelech, may be influenced by such interests, which could explain the push to cull the ostriches rather than support the research.
- UBC's Responsibility: As part of CCABL3, UBC has a duty to ensure that any research it supports, especially involving RG3 pathogens, adheres to national and international biosafety standards. The farm's practices, if endorsed or overlooked by UBC affiliates like Pelech, could be seen as a failure of this responsibility.
- Public Perception and Trust: The discrepancy between Pelech's endorsement of the research and the farm's non-compliance could erode public trust in UBC and the CCABL3. This is particularly sensitive given the historical context of lab safety failures and the ongoing debate over COVID-19 research transparency.

Conclusion

The activities at Universal Ostrich Farm, as described, do not align with the CCABL3's requirements for handling SARS-CoV-2. Injecting birds in an open-air environment, transporting eggs and products without proper containment, and storing antigens and antibodies at the farm violate critical BL3 protocols that the CCABL3 is meant to enforce. UBC's involvement, through figures like Pelech, raises questions about oversight and compliance. Supporters visiting the farm or engaging with its products are at risk due to these breaches, and the CCABL3's credibility could be compromised if it does not address this situation. The broader implications include potential public health risks, legal liabilities, and conflicts of interest that warrant further investigation and action by regulatory bodies.

Website references provided by Grok.

https://ccabl3.ca/

https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/canadian-biosafety-standards-guidelines/handbook-second-edition/chapter-11-15.html

https://www.bu.edu/research/ethics-compliance/safety/biological-safety/ibc/resources/biosafetymanual/chapter-11-transportation-of-biological-materials/


https://ccac.ca/Documents/Standards/Guidelines/Antibody_production.pdf

Context on the above:

The following are public social media posts from Universal Ostrich Farm (highlighting added for content).

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Karen Greba Espersen's Post





Nakusp & Area : Pets & more - Join Karen Greba Espersen - April 12, 2024 - 🚱

Just reminding everyone that we have the Ostrich Sh#t! \$35 a large bobcat scoop and great for gardening, trees, and plants. Any where you need to give back good nutrients to your soil we have your problem solved. We also have some mulch bales if anyone is in need. Contact the owners at the Ostrich Farm 778-692-9389 Dave or Karen 250-938-7447. Delivery available

April 12th, 2024 - Karen Esperson (farm owner)

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Karen Greba Espersen's Post




Around the Block Lumby Karen Greba Espersen · April 12, 2024 · 🔇

Just reminding everyone that we have the Ostrich Sh#t! \$35 a large bobcat scoop and great for gardening, trees, and plants. Any where you need to give back good nutrients to your soil we have your problem solved. We also have some mulch bales if anyone is in need. Contact the owners at the ostrich farm in Edgewood, 778-692-9389 Dave or Karen 250-938-7447.

April 12th, 2024 - Karen Esperson (farm owner)

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
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April 12th, 2024 - Karen Esperson (farm owner)

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




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British Columbia and Ontario right now. We have been doing this for 32 years and loving it.

February 21st, 2023 - Karen Esperson (farm owner)


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Karen Greba Espersen shared a memory. June 8, 2022 · 🕄


This was so exciting finishing our complete ostrich oil product line that deliver results to helping people with serious skin problems. We have been going strong ever since.



June 8th, 2022 - Karen Esperson (farm owner)

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After crossing the Arrow Lakes on the Needles ferry in British Columbia's West Kootenays, an observant motorist heading west towards Lumby and Vernon might spy a flock of large, long necked birds running energetically around a trim, neatly fenced pasture.

Interview with ostrich farm owners - February 10th, 2021

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https://www.westernstandard.news/news/exclusive-ostrich-farm-owner- warns-of-broader-implications-of-federal-agency-ordering-mass-cull/64939	This article raises more questions than answers.
Standard	The family have tested positive for Avian Flu (H5N1) antibodies from being exposed to the birds - and they are encouraging children to be there!
EXCLUSIVE: Ostrich farm owner warns of broader implications of	They now believe in natural immunity to COVID - which would make their whole business model from 2020 moot.
federal agency ordering mass cull "We're not going to allow that fear-mongering to take hold."	They talk about viruses that require Level 3 containment and one that requires Level 4 containment.
Katie Pasitney, daughter and spokeswoman for the owners of the Universal Ostrich Farm in Edgewood, BC WS Canva	All part of an open air bird farm that ran tours in 2020 and is now surrounded by bouncy castles and freedom fighters.
Published on: 22 May 2025, 2:59 pm	WHAT IS REALLY GOING ON HERE?
She pointed to her farm's work with ostrich antibodies, a field she believes holds promise for combating diseases like COVID-19, MRSA, and even Ebola.	COVID, MRSA, EBOLA - LEVEL 4 BIO LAB SECURITY REQUIREMENTS? https://www.cmaj.ca/content/161/9/1171 The strange world inside Canada's only level-4 containment laboratory "After all, the level-4 area of this laboratory could eventually house some of the bad boys from the world of virology: Ebola, Marburg, Lassa, herpesviru"
Her family, she revealed, tested positive for H5N1 antibodies after exposure to their flock, yet none fell ill.	THE FARM FAMILY TESTED POSITIVE FOR H5N1! WHEN?
"No one's been hospitalized here, and no one's sick," she said, challenging the narrative of a deadly threat.	IF THE FARM OWNERS ARE SO CONFIDENT IN NATURAL IMMUNITY FOR COVID - WHAT WAS THEIR BUSINESS MODEL FOR COVID EXPERIMENTATION AND THE COVID MASKS AND NASAL SPRAYS THEY WERE WORKING ON?
She emphasized the importance of natural immunity, advocating for antibody research her farm is pioneering alongside a Japanese scientist, Dr. Yasuhiro Tsukamoto.	Karen Esperson - Linkedin profile https://www.linkedin.com/in/karen-espersen-a82b563a/ WE are presently producing Neutralizing <u>COVID 19</u> Antibodies. These amazing antibodies also <u>cover</u> any variants that come along. WE are working hard to find the right company <u>to put these</u> antibodies into a nasal spray. Very Very proud of our work
"We're repeating a cycle, we're repeating the COVID-19 times," she added, referring to scientists' widespread, long-held denial that there was such a thing as natural immunity for the COVID-19 virus.	https://www.nsnews.com/coronavirus-covid-19-local-news/bc-ostrich-farm-developing- antibodies-that-could-put-an-end-to-coronavirus-4216550 "Working with a lab back east, <u>WE inoculated our hens</u> with the dead <u>COVID-19 virus</u> ." "This is a very natural process and last year <u>WE</u> were able to block 99.9 per cent of the

The CFIA's approach, Pasitney argued, is rooted in fear-mongering rather than facts.

Reference to Western Standard interview with Kate Pasitney, May 22nd, 2025

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Would you buy food from or take your kids to a BL3 lab?

What are BSL3 laboratories?

A biosafety level (BSL), pathogen/protection level, or containment level is a set of biocontainment precautions required to isolate dangerous biological agents in an enclosed laboratory facility. The levels of containment range from the lowest biosafety level 1(BSL1) to the highest at level 4 (BSL4).

BSL3 is commonly used for research and diagnostic work involving various microbes which can be transmitted by aerosols and/or cause severe disease, and <u>SARS-CoV-2</u> is among them. BSL3 and 4 laboratories must take rigorous precautions such as airflow systems, multiple containment rooms, sealed containers, positive pressure personnel suits, established protocols for all procedures, extensive personnel training, and high levels of security to control access to the facility.




Our team CCABL3 is governed by an Executive Committee (EC) and includes members from all U15 universities with BSL3 laboratories across Canada.





It is Easter time and we have had a jump start on the laying season this year. We normally do not get lot of eggs laid until the end of April. The birds must be happy and are blessing us! We are selling Ostrich eggs for eating for a short time only! \$25 each. One Ostrich egg is the same as 24 chicken eggs and lower in Cholesterol then chicken eggs. A little sweeter but really fluffy to cook with. Great for omelets, haking or painting for Easter. Call the owners of the ostrich farmKaren 250-938-7447 or Dave 778-692-9389. It takes 1 hour to hard boil an Ostrich Egg! Fun Fact!



Context of Dr. Steven Pelech's interview

Further reading on sources to additional reading material, including court filings.

<u>Universal Ostrich Farms: Did Anyone Actually Read The Decision? Or Anything Else? – Canuck Law</u> <u>https://canucklaw.ca/universal-ostrich-farms-1/</u>

<u>Universal Ostrich Farms, Part 2: The Pelech Affidavit, \$48,000 Per Egg – Canuck Law</u> <u>https://canucklaw.ca/universal-ostrich-farms-2/</u>

<u>Universal Ostrich Farms, Part 3: The Bilinski Affidavit, And Immune Biosolutions – Canuck Law</u> <u>https://canucklaw.ca/universal-ostrich-farms-3/</u>

- Why are the appropriate authorities not acting in this matter?
- Why are clear facts not being reported by either Alt or Mainstream media?
- Why are so many Social Influencers, Alt Media and Mainstream media complicit in a lack of transparency in critical risk facts or any relevant facts?
- Does anyone really care about the birds (initially commodities for cash and now used as research lab animals for profit)?
- Does anyone really care about the people (including children playing on bouncy castles at the farm/uncontrolled BL3 lab) who are put at risk due to this uncontrolled experiment and an increasingly volatile situation?

I have questions. You should too.

David Dickson is a Consulting C.E.O./C.I.O and owner at DKS DATA